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John L. Pollock is trying to build a person.
Specifically, he has constructed a rational architecture, dubbed OSCAR
(1999), for an artificial intellect, a system which will take in perceptual input
from its surroundings, form beliefs, have likes and dislikes about the situation it
believes itself to be in, formulate plans of action for making its situation more to
its liking, evaluate and adopt such plans, and carry them out. Such a system,
Pollock believes, will have thoughts and feelings in much the same way as
human beings do, and thus will have the same moral standing as a human
being. In short, it will be a person.
The failure so far of the research program of strong artificial intelligence (strong
AI) to fulfill its extravagant promises Pollock attributes to the lack of a
computationally implemented general theory of rationality. Researchers in AI,
he holds, have relied on unformulated intuitions about rationality, which are not
good enough. Building on more than 30 years of research in theoretical and
applied epistemology, Pollock proposes to remedy the lack he perceives.
The theory of rationality implemented in OSCAR takes positions on many
issues discussed in critical thinking, informal logic and the theory of
argumentation. Without accepting (or rejecting) the project of strong AI, I
propose to discuss the positions Pollock takes, and the reasons he gives for
them. In general, I will be endorsing his arguments. Pollock’s theory of
rationality, I will argue, is a sophisticated system which anybody with a
scholarly interest in what it means to be a rational agent must take seriously.
Pollock has invited researchers with interests in such topics as induction,
analogy and practical reasoning to use OSCAR as the basis for computational
implementation of proposed systems for such reasoning. I believe that we
should take him up on this offer.

1. The basis of norms of rationality
Pollock (1995: 1-3) takes a naturalistic approach to the theory of knowledge.
He takes it that human beings know how to reason, although they do not always
do so correctly and they are in general not introspectively aware of their
procedural knowledge. Philosophical epistemology is an attempt to articulate
this implicit knowhow, and is thus a way of doing empirical human psychology.
One could object that this approach relativizes the theory of rationality unduly to
the accidents of human psychology as it has evolved through the last two
million years. Consider a proposed norm of rationality: if a rational agent

believes that a disjunction is true and that one of its two disjuncts is false, that
agent should either add the remaining disjunct to its stock of beliefs or remove
one of the two aforementioned present beliefs from that stock. On Pollock’s
account, the proposed norm has the same status as a statement about the
expected behaviour of any complex physical system. If true, it is exactly parallel
to the following norm for the behaviour of the contemporary automobile: if an
automobile is moving forward in a straight line and its driver turns its steering
wheel to the left, the automobile should turn towards the left. This norm is just
an empirical description of how the physical system generally functions,
providing there are no unusual conditions such as a very slippery road surface
or a break in the steering system. It is another question, on the design level,
whether the direction of motion of automobiles should be controlled by a
steering wheel operated by a manipulator who faces forward and sits off
centre. A purely naturalistic approach to human rationality does not address
such questions about the adequacy of the design, perhaps assuming that the
operation of natural selection on the transmission of genetic information to
contemporary human beings has ensured that human beings are optimally
rational (in their competencies, if not in their performances). But evolutionary
theory provides no such Panglossian reassurance, particularly if we pay
attention to such human "spandrels" as the appendix or male nipples: who
knows what similar excrescences lurk in human procedural knowledge of how
to reason, perhaps making it in some respects irrational? Indeed, reliance on
evolutionary theory to justify the correctness of human rationality would beg the
question, since the development and justification of evolutionary theory has
itself proceeded according to implicit norms of rationality which have been
assumed to be correct. The argument against using evolutionary theory to
ground norms of rationality recapitulates Frege’s arguments against
psychologism with respect to the foundations of logic.
Fortunately for Pollock, he has a second approach to constructing norms of
rationality: a design approach (1995: 3). On this approach, rationality is a
solution to certain design problems. The basic design problem is for the
rational agent to interact with its surroundings so as to keep itself in existence
and (in the case of humans) to perpetuate its species (1995: 6, n. 3); one might
add that humans also manifest an impulse to understand how in general the
world works, even when this understanding appears to contribute nothing to the
survival of an individual or the perpetuation of the species. Pollock argues that
much of the general architecture of rational thought, including human rational
thought, can be inferred by taking a design stance. On specific details,
however, it may turn out that human rational competencies are not optimal, or
at least that there are defensible alternatives. Thus a less purely descriptive
approach to rationality becomes possible.

2. Grades of cognition and the limits of rationality
On Pollock’s account, there is a gradation among agents in how they act on

their environment to make their survival more likely (1995: 8-12). The simplest
non-cognitive agent merely reacts to perceptual input; it does not learn. A more
complex non-cognitive agent can acquire new reflexes through operant
conditioning, which requires that the agent have built-in likes and dislikes for
types of situations. Epistemic cognition forms mental representations of the
world through epistemic reasoning. Simple cognitive agents would react to
such representations through built-in reflexes, perhaps supplemented by
conditioning. A more complex cognitive agent would have practical cognition
directing its activity on the basis of both its beliefs about its situation and its
likes and dislikes; the practical reasoning involved in such direction may vary
in complexity from deciding on a single act to formulating a plan which takes a
lifetime to execute.
As Pollock points out, it would be impossible for any agent to accomplish its
design objective purely through epistemic and practical reasoning. Such
reasoning is too slow; an agent which had to stop and think about what to do
when it put its hand on something very hot would suffer a severe burn and
probably permanent injury before the ratiocination was completed. Hence even
a rational agent needs what Pollock calls Q&I modules (1995: 10), quick and
inflexible routines for belief formation and practical cognition. Among human
Q&I modules for belief formation are the computation of trajectories, much
ordinary inductive inference, and intuitive integration. Practical Q&I modules
include feature-liking; such built-in optative dispositions as desires to alleviate
hunger, avoid pain, and pursue pleasure; a conditioning mechanism for
forming new optative dispositions; and emotions like embarrassment and
indignation.
Such Q&I modules have the advantage of speed but the disadvantage of
inflexibility. Rationality is slow but flexible; it allows an agent to form beliefs and
direct its actions when Q&I modules do not apply or when there is an explicit
reason to override their output. A fully epistemically rational agent gives
ultimate priority to rationality over Q&I modules in belief formation, while a fully
practically rational agent gives such ultimate priority to rationality in the
direction of its action. A fully rational agent is both fully epistemically rational
and fully practically rational; Pollock thinks that humans are closer to full
epistemic rationality than they are to full practical rationality.

3. Practical rationality
A standard model of practical rationality, which Pollock traces back to Hume
(1995: 33) but which can already be found in Aristotle, supposes that practical
reasoning arrives at decisions to act on the basis of a combination of beliefs
and desires. Pollock argues convincingly (1995: 12-35) that this model is far
too simple. He argues that practical reasoning requires seven distinct types of
states: beliefs, situation-likings, feature-likings, intentions, and three kinds of
desires (primitive, instrumental, present-tense action).

Situation-likings are fundamental. The function of rationality, Pollock
supposes, is to make the world more to its possessor’s liking. Hence a rational
agent must have a way of telling how likable a situation is–a feeling produced
by the agent’s situation as the agent believes it to be. Humans are
introspectively aware of such feelings.
Intentions encode the adoption of a plan. Planning involves constructing or
discovering courses of action that might lead to the world’s being more likable
than otherwise. A rational agent will adopt a plan whose expected situationliking is determined by deliberation to be at least as great as that of any of the
competing plans under consideration. Ideally, a rational agent choosing among
plans would consider each possible outcome of implementing each plan,
estimate the probability of each such outcome given adoption of the plan,
evaluate how likable that outcome would be, and adopt a plan whose weighted
average of outcome likability was no lower than that of any other plan under
consideration. A possible outcome is a type of situation characterized by
certain features, whereas an agent’s primitive likings and dislikings are for
situation-tokens; the likability of a possible outcome is thus an expected
likability, a weighted average of the likability of token situations of that type. To
arrive at such an expected likability requires a cardinal measure of the likability
of token situations. I have been somewhat surprised to discover that the
humans I have consulted have no difficulty answering the question, "On a scale
of 1 to 10, how good are you feeling right now?" Pollock however proposes to
construct a cardinal measure indirectly, on the basis of a "quantitative feel" of a
comparative preference relation among four arbitrarily chosen situations; he
thinks that humans can introspectively tell whether they prefer situation B to
situation A more than they prefer situation D to situation C. Further
mathematical manipulation, combined with some assumptions about the
preference relation, will produce from these data a cardinal measure allowing
for unique comparisons of expected likabilities.
Feature-likings are a shortcut required by constraints of time and resources.
Theoretically, a rational agent could work out by reasoning what features of
situations are causally relevant to their being liked or disliked. In practice, the
agent has to act before having time to go through the elaborate reasoning that
would be required. Hence a rational agent needs Q&I modules which provide
this information. Pollock speculates (1995: 20) that humans acquire featurelikings through their ability to imagine situations (which must be types rather
than tokens) and respond conatively to them; equally speculatively, we can
conjecture that humans recognize directly in a token situation those aspects of
it which they like or dislike–but perhaps what appears to be immediate
recognition is a product of learning. Parenthetically, Pollock notes that there
could be a rational agent for whom feature-likings are fundamental; such a
rational agent would need, Pollock argues, both a cardinal measure of
primitive feature-likings and a way of computing a liking for combinations of
features from the likings of individual features (1995: 20-21). Humans seem to
use Q&I modules to compute the comparative expected value of plans on the
basis of situation-likings and feature-likings; Pollock thinks that artificial

rational agents might be able to solve the integration problems required for this
computation explicitly.
Primitive desires encode goals and initiate planning. Goals, construed as
combinations of features, are required for planning by limitations of time and
resources. Starting with a specific goal is necessary for efficient interest-driven
epistemic reasoning, as opposed to a time-consuming random generation and
evaluation of plans. A plan which can attain a goal can be presumed to have a
positive expected value if the expected likability of the goal’s combination of
features is greater than the expected likability of the situation that would
otherwise result. But this presumption can be defeated by other features of the
situation that results from carrying out the plan. Considerations of feasibility
require that a rational agent not only form desires as a result of epistemic
reasoning about the expected likability of certain combinations of features, but
also have Q&I modules which propose goals and produce their default
adoption, unless the agent’s reasoning judges them unsuitable. Humans have
such optative dispositions to try to alleviate hunger, avoid pain and pursue
pleasure. Conditioning can lead to new optative dispositions. In a fully
practically rational agent, reasoning that a desired goal is unsuitable would
extinguish the desire, and reasoning that a goal is suitable would produce a
desire for it; Pollock notes drily (1995: 27-28) that humans are not fully rational
in either of these respects.
Instrumental desires are produced by adoption of a partial plan (for example,
getting a copy of this paper to my commentator’s philosophy department by
Tuesday morning as a way of achieving the goal of his receiving it before he
leaves on Wednesday for a conference); such desires initiate further planning.
Present-tense action desires are needed to initiate action, since adopted
plans may leave the scheduling of steps indefinite. Action-initiating desires
may be produced by optative dispositions or by the adoption of a plan. When
present-tense action desires conflict, an agent will act on the strongest of these
desires. Thus a rational agent will proportion the strength of such a desire
derived from an adopted plan to the expected likability of the tail of the plan,
that part of it which remains to be carried out. Pollock seems to assume that
the strength of desires produced by optative dispositions (e.g. a human
being’s disposition to try to alleviate its hunger) will also be proportional to the
expected value of satisfying them, because he thinks a rational agent should at
any given time perform the action it most wants to perform (1995: 31). But this
assumption seems implausible; a human being may for example have a fierce
desire to drink or eat what is in front of him or her and a weak desire to
postpone the satisfaction of this desire (for example in an extreme situation
where survival requires rationing a limited supply). There seems to be a need
in a fully practically rational agent to override a strong present-tense action
desire due to an optative disposition in the light of a rationally based
judgement that some alternative action has greater expected value; Pollock
(1995: 35) seems to assume that such reasoning would dispel the suboptimal
desire in a fully rational agent, but overriding it would also seem to be rational.

Pollock identifies four important consequences of the above-described
conception of practical rationality:
(1) As previously mentioned, practical reasoning requires more states than
beliefs and desires. It needs also situation-likings, feature-likings and
intentions. And desires are of three types--primitive, instrumental and presenttense action.
(2) A real agent cannot rely on ratiocination for all its practical cognition.
Constraints of time and resources require it to use Q&I modules, whose output
is correctable by ratiocination in a fully rational agent.
(3) All types of evaluative attitudes other than situation-likings are subject to
rational criticism. Feature-likings are irrational if the expected likability of a
situation possessing the feature(s) is relatively low. Instrumental desires can be
criticized by evaluating the plan from which they are derived. Primitive desires,
whether produced by optative dispositions or by ratiocination, can be criticized
on the ground that the goal they encode does not have a high relative expected
value. Present-tense action desires can be criticized (if they arise from
adoption of a plan) by evaluating the plan from which they are derived or (if they
arise from an optative disposition) by arguing that fulfilling them does not
contribute to living a good life, in the sense of a life in which the agent’s
situation-tokens are more likable than otherwise.
(4) Contrary to Hume, not all reasoning is epistemic. Pollock’s model includes
three types of non-epistemic state transitions which are subject to rational
evaluation: (a) from beliefs about the expected situation-likings of potential
goals to desires (adoption of goals), (b) from beliefs about the relative values
of plans to intentions (adoption of plans), and (c) from choosing the strongest
present-tense action desires to actions.

4. The interdependence of epistemic and practical cognition
Pollock argues that epistemic and practical cognition are distinct types, but
that they cannot be discussed in isolation because of the complex
interdependence between them. Attempts to reduce epistemic cognition to
practical cognition, by identifying it with practical cognition about what to
believe, founder on an infinite regress generated by the fact that all practical
cognition depends on beliefs about the agent’s current situation. Attempts to
treat epistemic cognition in isolation from practical cognition founder on the
fact that all epistemic cognition is interest-driven. "The whole point of epistemic
cognition is to help the agent solve practical problems." (195: 36) This claim
strikes me as overly restrictive, since some human beings sometimes deploy
epistemic reasoning simply for the sake of acquiring a general understanding
of the world, with not even an indirect connection to practical interests. Indeed,
such a theoretical orientation is responsible for the origins of western science
in the ancient Greek cosmologists, who were simply curious about how the

cosmos came to be, what shape the earth has, where it is in the cosmos, why it
stays where it is, and so on–with no ulterior practical interest in mind.
Nevertheless, Pollock is correct that the epistemic reasoning of a rational
agent is not just random derivation of conclusions from premisses, but is driven
by interests, whether practical or theoretical. He refers (1995: 36) to the
questions posed by practical cognition as ultimate epistemic interests. Not
only does practical cognition direct epistemic cognition, but epistemic
reasoning provides goals for practical cognition, encoded as epistemic
desires, e.g. the desire to know what time it is, which in general is satisfied not
by epistemic reasoning but by forming a plan and carrying it out. This
interdependence of epistemic and practical cognition is the central feature of
the architecture for rational cognition implemented in OSCAR.

5. Reasoning, inference graphs, and arguments
Epistemic reasoning, on Pollock’s account, proceeds from perceptual input or
previously held beliefs to further beliefs. Pollock understands by an argument
the record of the transitions involved in a sequence of reasoning; Pollock’s
"argument" is thus what is sometimes called complex argumentation, but
without any communication to an audience or with an interlocutor. A single
transition in such a sequence takes place from one or more reasons to a
conclusion in accordance with what he calls a reason schema, for example: ‘x
looks red to me’ is a reason for me to believe ‘x is red’; Pollock’s "reason
schemas" correspond to what are called "argument schemes" or
"argumentation schemas" in the argumentation literature. A linear argument
can be viewed as a finite sequence of propositions, each a member of input
(the premises not inferred from any reason) or inferable from previous
members of the sequence in accordance with a reason schema. Pollock
insists, against some models of argumentation structure in the artificial
intelligence literature, that there are non-linear arguments, in particular
arguments that discharge suppositions through conditionalization, reductio ad
absurdum or reasoning by cases (1995: 88). Whereas the structure of an
argument records the actual sequence of inferences by a reasoning agent,
Pollock uses inference graphs to record relations of dependence, which can
be compatible with more than one sequence of inferences; for example,
deducing from a conjunction each of its conjuncts, then reconjoining them,
gives rise to a single inference graph, regardless of the order in which the
conjuncts are deduced (1995: 87). Pollock has a perspicuous solution to the
problem of how to represent the distinction between linked and convergent
reasoning, or in another terminology between coordinatively compound and
multiple argumentation. A single inference to a conclusion from more than one
reason is represented by an arrow coming from each reason to a single node
for the conclusion; this diagrams linked reasoning (also called coordinatively
compound argumentation), where the reasons work together to support the
conclusion. Two or more independent arguments for a conclusion are
represented by having a separate node for each supporting separate

argument; this diagrams convergent reasoning (multiple argumentation). This
graphical technique allows Pollock to associate unique strengths with nodes
and to regard different nodes as defeated by different defeaters (1995: 88-89).
Pollock argues that the reasons used in epistemic reasoning are neither
linguistic items nor propositions but mental states, including perceptual images
as well as beliefs (1995: 54-55). His reason is that human beings form beliefs
directly on the basis of perceptual input, without having any beliefs about that
input; in fact, humans rarely have beliefs about what the things they see look
like, what the things they hear sound like, etc. In cases where the reasons are
beliefs, we can say, loosely, that ‘P & Q’ is a reason for ‘P’, when what we
mean is that believing ‘P & Q’ is a reason for believing ‘P’.
One of the difficult problems for representing argument structure in a standard
format is how to accommodate suppositional reasoning. Pollock writes
arguments in a vertical sequence, numbering each proposition sequentially,
and writing before a supposed reason the word "suppose", and before an
inferred conclusion "from" followed by the number of each reason used in
inferring it. Here is an example:
1. Suppose prob(F/G) $ r & Gc.
2. Suppose (p / -Fc).
3. Fc from 1.
4. -p from 2,3.
This is essentially the system used in contemporary formal logic texts for
exhibiting natural deduction proofs, but without any of the devices used in such
texts for tracking the dependency of inferred conclusions on particular
suppositions. In his system of inference graphs, however, Pollock tracks the
dependency by building a supposition into each node at which the supposition
is used (1995: 88). Thus a node encodes an inference to a sequent, an
ordered pair <X, p> whose first member X is a (possibly empty) set of
propositions and whose second member p is a single proposition inferred
relative to X as supposition. The inference graph corresponding to the above
argument would have as its first node the ordered pair <{prob(F/G) $ r & Gc},
Fc>, and as its second node, with an arrow descending to it from the first node,
the ordered pair <{prob(F/G) $ r & Gc, (p / -Fc)}, -p>.

6. Defeasible reasoning
Pollock sets himself firmly against deductivism with respect to epistemic
reasoning. That is, he opposes the view that the only good reasons for drawing
a conclusion are conclusive reasons, reasons which logically entail the
conclusion. In this respect, he agrees with the current trend in the artificial

intelligence literature, which has many systems of so-called non-monotonic
reasoning, reasoning in which new information can make it rational to cease to
draw the conclusion, even though the inference was perfectly good at the time
and the reasons on which it was based remain unchallenged. The artificial
intelligence literature, however, seems to regard such non-monotonic
reasoning as an unfortunate consequence of avoidable incompleteness of
information in a database. Pollock argues on the contrary that what he calls
defeasible reasoning is normal and quite unavoidable: "It is logically
impossible to reason successfully about the world around us using only
deductive reasoning." (1995: 41) Reasoning from the way things appear to the
way they are is unavoidably defeasible; it is impossible to construe physical
object statements as logical constructions from phenomenalist claims.
Reasoning from observed regularities to a universal generalization is
unavoidably defeasible. Reasoning from ‘most As are Bs and this is an A’ to
‘this is a B’ is unavoidably defeasible. "Almost everything we believe is
believed at least indirectly on the basis of defeasible reasoning, and things
could not have been any other way." (1995:42) To me these remarks are an
absolutely convincing refutation of deductivism.
"Defeasible reasoning" is so-called because it can be defeated. Even though
the conclusion follows by a legitimate reason schema and the reasons remain
unchallenged, new information may defeat the reasoning. An important
contribution of Pollock’s, almost universally adopted in the artificial intelligence
literature but hardly noticed in the informal logic and argumentation literature, is
that there are two kinds of defeaters. Where P is a prima facie reason (as
opposed to a conclusive reason) for Q, R is a rebutting defeater for P iff R is a
reason for denying Q. This is the type of defeater with which we are familiar.
For example, that I am keeping a sword for my friend is a prima facie reason
for giving it back to him when he asks for it, but that he intends to do harm to
himself with the sword is a reason for not giving it back to him when he asks for
it. My friend’s intention to harm himself defeats the reason that I am keeping
the sword for him. It does so by being a reason for the contradictory
conclusion. The other, less familiar kind of defeater Pollock identifies is what
he calls an undercutting defeater. Undercutting defeaters attack the
connection between the prima facie reason and the defeasibly drawn
conclusion rather than attacking the conclusion directly; where P is a prima
facie reason (as opposed to a conclusive reason) for Q, R is an undercutting
defeater for P iff R is a reason for denying that P would not be the case unless
Q were the case. For example, that an object looks red to me is a prima facie
reason for believing that it is red. The information that the object which looks
red to me is illuminated by red light undercuts the prima facie reason, because
it makes it unreasonable to infer from the object’s looking red that it is red;
when illuminated by red light, objects of many colours look red. But this
defeater does not give me any reason to believe that the object is not red; it is
not a rebutting defeater.

7. Strength of justification
How strongly does a sequence of reasoning support a conclusion to which it
leads? Pollock’s answer to this question is surprising, but I can find no fault
with the reasoning by which he gets to it. He begins by noting, sensibly enough,
that we need to assign strengths to the input states on which such reasoning is
based as well as to the conclusive or prima facie reasons used at each
inference link. A perceptual input can be more or less strong; for example, an
object can look more or less clearly red (1995: 101). To assign degrees of
strengths to reasons, Pollock uses as a standard of comparison instances of
the statistical syllogism: If r > 0.5 then ‘prob(F/G) $ r & Gc’ is a prima facie
reason for ‘Fc’, the strength of the reason being a monotonic increasing
function of r (1995: 93). Rather than taking r itself to be the measure of the
strength of the reason, Pollock takes 2 × [r - 0.5], which has the consequence
that the strength of an instance of statistical syllogism is 0 when r = 0.5 and 1
when r = 1; thus the strengths of reasons range between 0 and 1. The strength
of prima facie reasons other than instances of the statistical syllogism is
measured by taking those instances as a standard of comparison, in the
following way: "If X is a prima facie reason for p, the strength of this reason is 2
× [r - 0.5], where r is a real number such that an argument for ¬p based upon
the suppositions ‘prob(F/G) $ r & Gc’ and ‘(p / -Fc)’ and employing the
statistical syllogism exactly counteracts the argument for p based upon the
supposition X." (1995: 94) The consequence that all reasons can be linearly
ordered by strength is natural, but conflicts with some recent proposals on
nonmonotonic reasoning.
If an argument combines several inferences using reasons of less than unit
strength, how is the degree of support for the ultimate conclusion to be
computed? The usual answer is to treat the degree of strength of each reason
as a probability, and to use the probability calculus to compute how strongly the
input supports the ultimate conclusion. The ultimate conclusion is regarded as
justified only if it is made sufficiently probable by the cumulative reasoning.
Pollock offers a powerful argument against this generic Bayesianism. He
notes that, for the Bayesian, inference rules can be applied blindly, without
making probability calculations, only if it follows from the probability calculus
that the probability of the conclusion licensed by the inference rules is greater
than or equal to the minimum of the probabilities of each premiss to which it is
applied; such an inference rule he describes as probabilistically valid (1995:
95-96). But in general deductively valid rules of inference from multiple
premisses are not probabilistically valid; if more than one premiss has a
probability less than 1, then according to the probability calculus the conclusion
will have a probability less than that of any premiss. This means that, if an
engineer combines 100 pieces of information, each with a probability of .99, in
a chain of deductive reasoning used to compute the size of a girder for a
bridge, her conclusion would have a probability too small to be justified–which
means that it would be impossible to build bridges. Even more damaging than
this counter-intuitive result is the consequence that generic Bayesianism is

self-defeating: a Bayesian reasoner cannot compute the probabilities required
to decide whether to hold a belief. Suppose, for example, that a Bayesian
reasoner holds the following beliefs:
prob(PwQ) = prob(P) + prob(Q) ! prob(P&Q)
prob(P) = 0.5
prob(Q) = 0.49
prob(P&Q) = 0.
In the typical cases to which belief updating is relevant, the second and third
premisses will have a probability less than 1. Hence the inference to the
conclusion that prob(PwQ) = 0.99 is not probabilistically valid. The Bayesian
reasoner has no way to calculate the probability of the conclusion. Trying to
replace the second and third premisses by their conjunction leads to an infinite
regress, since the same difficulty recurs in trying to compute the probability of
the conjunction using conditional probability (1995: 96-98). Thus generic
Bayesianism is according to Pollock incoherent. Its mistake is to treat
epistemic "probability" as a probability in the sense of the probability calculus.
Since deductive reasoning from multiple premisses preserves high epistemic
"probability", this probability is not a probability in the sense of the classical
probability calculus. Curiously, Pollock does not reply to the standard "Dutch
book" argument that rational degrees of confidence in propositions must obey
the laws of the probability calculus, or to the more sophisticated versions of
that argument due to Ramsey and his followers. If Pollock is right, there must
be a hitherto undetected flaw in these arguments.
Pollock’s substitute for Bayesianism is what he calls the weakest link principle.
Applied to deductive reasoning, this is the principle that the degree of support
of the conclusion is the minimum of the degrees of support of a deductive
argument’s premisses (1995: 99). Any account which makes the degree of
support weaker than that minimum, Pollock notes, will be self-defeating in the
same way as generic Bayesianism. And the weakest link principle seems to
be the only principle that is not completely ad hoc which explains how adding
inferences from new premisses weakens an argument. Pollock extends the
weakest link principle to defeasible arguments by noting that, whenever P is a
prima facie reason for Q, we can use conditionalization to construct an
argument for (P e Q) with no premisses, whose conclusion is therefore
supported to the same degree as the strength of the prima facie reason. This
technique allows us to reformulate any defeasible argument so that its
conclusion is a deductive consequence of input along with a number of
conditionals so justified; hence, by the weakest link principle for deductive
arguments, the degree of support for the conclusion is the minimum of the
degree of justification of the members of input used in the argument and the
strengths of the prima facie reasons (1995: 100-101). Thus the weakest link
principle for defeasible arguments is that the degree of support of the

conclusion of a defeasible argument is the minimum of the strengths of the
prima facie reasons used in it and the strengths of the input states to which it
appeals (1995: 101).
Another surprising claim about strength of support is that two independent
reasons for a conclusion do not provide stronger support than one (1995: 101102). "If we have two separate undefeated arguments for a conclusion, the
degree of justification for the conclusion is simply the maximum of the strengths
of the two arguments." (102) Pollock does not so much argue for this principle
as explain away apparent counter-examples. If the testimony of one person is
confirmed by the independent testimony of another person, we generally take
their joint testimony to support their claim more strongly than the testimony of
either one without the other. But this increase in support is not due to there
being two independent reasons for the same conclusion, Pollock claims.
Rather, it is due to our having a single combined reason which is usually a
stronger prima facie reason than the initial reason; in general, prob(p is true /
S1 asserts p and S2 asserts p and S1 … S2) > prob(p is true / S1 asserts p). In
general, but not always. In a community where speakers tend to confirm each
other’s statements only where they are fabrications, the reverse is true. Anyone
who thinks that accrual of reasons provides stronger support than the strongest
of the reasons so accrued needs to consider whether apparent instances of
such accrual are in fact of the form Pollock identifies. My own brief
consideration of apparent counterexamples to his position suggests that he is
right.

8. Justification and defeat

So far we have been considering the strength of support for a belief without
attending to the possibility that a defeasible inference can be defeated.
Pollock’s position on when inferences are defeated is the most subtle of which
I am aware. It has been worked out over several published iterations, each one
accommodating cases which the previous one failed to solve satisfactorily.
Pollock has used the most recent version of his theory (1994, 1995: 102-140)
to produce congenial solutions to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the
preface.
The account begins with an analysis of when one node in an inference graph
rebuts or undercuts another. A rebutting node must have as its conclusion the
negation [actually the contradictory–DH] of the node it rebuts. But in addition it
must depend on suppositions which are a subset of those on which the node it
rebuts depends. Otherwise one could rebut any defeasible argument simply by
noting that the contradictory opposite of the argument’s conclusion can be
deduced from itself as supposition. Further, the strength of support for the
conclusion of the rebutting node must be at least as great as the strength of

support for the node being rebutted. A weaker argument for an opposite
conclusion, Pollock argues, does not diminish the strength of support from the
original argument. Otherwise two such weaker arguments would suffice to
rebut the original argument, and that is just the principle of accrual already
rejected, that two independent arguments can have a strength greater than that
of either of them. Cases where a weaker argument for an opposing conclusion
seems to diminish the strength of support from the original argument are
handled analogously to cases of apparent accrual of support from two
independent arguments; we do not have two arguments, but one new one, with
a different set of premisses. Putting all these points together leads Pollock to
formulate the following definition of when one node " in an inference graph
rebuts another node $: "(1) $ is a pf-node [node representing a conclusion
reached by a prima facie reason–DH] of some strength > supporting some
proposition q relative to a supposition K; (2) " is a node of strength 0 and
supports ¬q relative to a supposition O, where O f K; and (3) 0 $ >." (1995:
103) The definition of when one node undercuts another node is analogous,
except that an undercutting node supports ((p1 & ... & pk q q), where p1, ..., pk
are the propositions supported by the immediate ancestors of $ (i.e. the
conclusions of the sequents at the nodes from which $ is immediately inferred)
and ‘((p1 & ... & pk q q)’ means that it is not the case that (p1 & ... & pk )
wouldn’t be true unless q were true (1995: 86). Pollock encodes defeat
relations between nodes in an inference graph in the form of defeat links, with
a specific type of arrow going from the rebutting or undercutting node to the
node it defeats.
The central concept in Pollock’s account of justification and defeat is the
assignment of a defeat status to a node in an inference graph, either
"defeated" or "undefeated". The constraints on a status assignment are such
that a given inference graph may be subject to different status assignments. A
node in an inference graph is undefeated iff every status assignment assigns
"undefeated" to it, defeated outright iff no status assignment assigns
"undefeated" to it, and otherwise defeated provisionally. Because some
inference graphs make it impossible to assign defeat statuses to all nodes
consistent with the basic conception of a status assignment, Pollock admits
partial status assignments which assign no status to some nodes (1995: 122124). A status assignment is then a maximal partial status assignment, i.e. a
partial status assignment which is not properly contained in another partial
status assignment (1995: 124). A partial status assignment is an assignment
of the status "defeated" or "undefeated" to a subset of the nodes of an
inference graph which meets the following three conditions: (1) It assigns the
status "undefeated" to every d-initial node, i.e. every node such that neither it
nor any of its ancestors is the terminus of a defeat link. Second, it assigns
"undefeated" to every node to whose immediate ancestors it assigns
"undefeated" and to whose defeating nodes it assigns "defeated". Third, it
assigns "defeated" to every node which has an immediate ancestor to which it
assigns "defeated" or a defeating node to which it assigns "undefeated".
(1995: 123-124)

A conclusion is justified if and only if it is supported by an undefeated node of
the inference graph of a sequence of epistemic reasoning. It is justified to any
degree up to and including the strength of the strongest undefeated node which
supports it.

9. Justification and warrant
Whether a belief is justified, and to what degree, is a function of how far a
reasoner who entertains the belief has got in its reasoning. Even without new
input, further reasoning can produce a conclusion which rebuts or undercuts a
previously undefeated node; hence, what was justified becomes unjustified.
Conversely, an undefeated defeater can become defeated, so that what was
unjustified becomes justified.
Pollock uses the term warrant to talk about whether a sequent is ultimately
justified by an indefinitely continuing sequence of reasoning. A sequent is
warranted to a certain degree by a certain input iff it is justified to that degree
at every stage in the sequence of reasoning from input after some stage
(1995: 133). It is ideally warranted to a certain degree by a certain input iff the
set of all nodes producible by the reasoner includes an undefeated node at
least that strong which supports the sequent. Curiously enough, warrant and
ideal warrant are not equivalent (1995: 133-134).

10. Conclusion
I have touched on only some aspects of Pollock’s theory of rationality. Other
aspects relevant to informal logic, critical thinking and the theory of
argumentation include reflexive cognition (1995: 43-46), acceptance rules, the
statistical syllogism and its generalizations, definite and indefinite
probabilities, direct inference, enumerative induction, statistical induction, the
control structure for interest-driven reasoning (monotonic and defeasible)
which reasons both forwards from the input and backwards from the desired
conclusion, and plan-based practical reasoning (1995: 140-298). In the end,
Pollock is able to summarize his architecture for rational cognition in a single
diagram (1995: 304), which of course requires extensive interpretation.
Pollock has often changed his position on the nature of rationality, in response
to difficulties that he found in previous accounts. In fact, one of the virtues of
computational implementation, in this area as in others, is that running a
program discloses problems that might not (indeed, did not) strike a critical
human reasoner. Pollock’s work has the complementary virtue, often missing in
"seat-of-the-pants" artificial intelligence research, of philosophical
sophistication about the foundations of the computational implementation.
Pollock’s plan in his OSCAR project is to produce a general architecture for

rationality and an inference engine for interest-driven defeasible reasoning
(which he has already done), then use it to analyse such specific kinds of
reasoning as abduction (inference to the best explanation), reasoning by
analogy, causal reasoning, temporal reasoning, spatial reasoning, reasoning
about change and persistence, and reasoning about other rational agents. He
is distributing OSCAR in order to encourage investigators to use it in their
investigations and provide feedback on its design (1999: I-5). I believe that
those of us with interests in norms and control structures for specific types of
reasoning should take him up on his offer.
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